Infantry - A Summary

The victories of Cceur de Lion were due to skilful cooperation of heavy cavalry and crossbowmen, whose bolts were further ranging and more deadly than the Turkish arrows.*^ So deadly were they that in 1139 A.D. the second Lateran Council condemned the use of the crossbow, except against infidels ; but it spread nevertheless, especially in France, Italy, and Germany. Borrowed from the balista, it seems to have been made available as a hand weapon only about the beginning of the eleventh century.

About this time a burgher militia began to grow up in the French towns. They obtained charters, either by purchase from their lords, who were in want of money for Crusades, or by appeals to the king. “The king has been said to be the founder of the communes, but the reverse is more nearly the truth ; it is the communes that established the king,” says Michelet. They were enabled by their charters to maintain a well-armed force, which was liable to be summoned for the king’s service, though it was seldom willing to go far from home. The towns of Picardy sent companies of crossbowmen to the army with which Philip Augustus won the battle of Bouvines (1214 a.d.). But he owed his victory to his men-at-arms. The French communal troops proved no match for the Flemish foot. The men who distinguished themselves most were some Braban9on mercenaries in King John’s pay, who refused to surrender and were cut to pieces.

The wealthy and turbulent cities of Flanders provided a sturdy militia, whose reputation gained greatly by their victory at Courtrai (1302 a.d.). It was something new and marvellous, as Villani says, for a feudal army of 50,000 men, including 7500 cavalry and 10,000 crossbowmen, to be beaten by 20,000 burghers. The result was due to that arrogance and eagerness to be foremost which was so often fatal to the French chivalry. The flanks as well as the front of the Flemings were covered by a ditch. The leaders of the Italian mercenaries proposed to march round and post their men where they could intercept supplies. ” The Flemings,” they said, ” are great eaters and drinkers ; if we keep them long fasting, they will grow faint. They will quit their ground ; and then the cavalry can charge and rout them without risk.” But these ” Lombard counsels ” were scouted. The foot were not to be allowed to have the honour of the victory. The men-at-arms dashed to the front, floundered into the ditch, and were speared or struck down by ” godendags,” long-handled maces with iron spikes, like the Swiss ” morning-star.” *

But two years afterwards it was shown near Lille that a much larger number of Flemish burghers was no match for a feudal army properly handled, and this was confirmed at Cassel in 1328, and again at Roosebecke in 1382, when Van Artevelde was killed with 25,000 men. If infantry was to recover its old position it must combine excellence in the use of missiles with excellence in handto-hand fighting, and it was the association of the English archer with the dismounted man-at-arms that gave the first real shock to the feudal military system.

Something more mobile and efficient was required to meet sudden descents of the Danes upon the coasts which formed the chief danger to the peace of the kmgdom. In 86G a.d. Charles the Bald issued an edict that all freeholders who had or might have horses should jom the host mounted, but by the end of the tenth century it had become exclusively a feudal host, made up of the contingents of lords who had received grants of land as fiefs or benefices, and were under contract to bring their quota of mounted men into the field.

Fiefs and offices (dukes, counts, &c.) which were at first revocable or for life only, became hereditary, and the inroads of the Northmen gave the holders of them an opportunity to buUd strongholds in which they could defy the king himself. CivU wars among the Carolingian prmces weakened their authority, and enabled some of their vassals to become stronger and more independent. In the general struggle for existence the weaker lords sought safety by “commending themselves” to the stronger lords, surrendermg their lands, and receiving them back as fiefs. The freemen of the conquered (GalloRoman) race fared worse. Some of them were allowed to contmue to hold land subject to a quit-rent, but the bulk of them became serfs. After a time there was no land without its lord, and the lords took care not to aive arms or training to an alien and oppressed peasantry. Froissarts description of the Jacquerie^ shows how the pea.sants, unarmed as they were except with knives and staves, would now and then rise, and revenge themselves on theulords by fearful outrages.

Besides the valets of the men-at-arms, foot archers and crossbowmen were required, especially for garrisons and sieges. These were mostly mercenaries drawn from various quarters, and the term solidarii (soldiers) came into use for hired men early in the eleventh century .^ The army of adventurers with which William of Normandy invaded England comprised not only bowmen, but some mail-clad infantry armed with spears and swords. The Crusader armies also were largely composed of foot, and they had the more need for missile weapons as they had to deal with an enemy skilled in the use of the bow. The, earlier Crusaders suffered much from their inferiority in this respect. In 1104 a.d. they met with a disaster on the very ground, near Carrhie, where the Parthians had routed Crassus’s legions.

The germ of feudalism is to be seen in Tacitus’s description of the German tribes, though the fruit was slow in forming : ” It is the renown and glory of a chief to be distinguished for the number and valour of his followers. … To defend, to protect him, to ascribe one’s own brave deeds to his renown, is the height of loyalty. The chief fights for victory ; his vassals fight for their chief . . . men look to the liberality of their chief for their war-horse and their blood-stained and victorious lance. Feasts and entertainments, which, though inelegant, are plentifully furnished, are their only pay. The means of this bounty come from war and rapine It is a duty among them to adopt the feuds as well as the friendships of a father or a kinsman.”

Bands held together by ties of this kmd might co for a time into an army, but they fought for pe not for national objects. Their chiefs claimed the ngh of private war, and courts of justice were –ely court of conciliation whose awards were not bmdmg. In the rudest times there was little difference of equipment between one man and another, but the conquest of the Roman provinces put wealth and technical skill at their disposal, and the art of the armourer fostered inequal y^ The weight of armour tempted men to ride, and rapidity of movement was important for the forays and skirmishes of which private war mainly consisted. Hence the chief and his chosen followers became mounted men-at-arms Those who had neither horses nor armour fought at great disadvantage and were held in contempt The Ly name “infantry” is significant. It dates from a time when those who went afoot were the lads m attendance on armoured horse soldiers for whom the term miles came to be reserved.

Charlemagne resisted this tendency. While exacting due service from his vassals, and doing his best to secure a large and well-armed force of cavalry, he msisted on the old principle of the “ban,” that every IVeeman was bound to serve at the king’s summons. In order to obtain a well-equipped infantry militia instead of a mere horde of peasants, such as would be yielded by a levy en .nassX provided that the smaller owners sho^d be grouped, and that one of them should eo as the armed at their joint cost. But under his successors this militia fell mto disuse.

While the Goths, Lombards, and other races which had settled in the plains of Eastern Europe became nations of horsemen, the races which occupied North Germany and Scandinavia were accustomed to fight on foot. Tacitus says that the chief strength of the Germans was in their infantry ; their cavalry was not well mounted, and had no skill in evolutions.^ It was the same with the Franl^s. As described by Agathias in the sixth century, ” they wear neither mail-shirt nor greaves, and their legs are only protected by strips of linen or leather. They have hardly any horsemen, but their foot soldiery are bold and well practised in war. They bear swords and shields, but never use the sling or bow. Their missiles are axes and barbed javelins.” ^ The francisca was their special weapon, as the seax or short sword was the weapon of the Saxons. It was a single-bladed axe with a curved edge, which could be either thrown or wielded, like a tomahawk.

Theodebert, the grandson of Clovis, invaded Italy with an army of 100,000 men in 539 a.d., when Belisarius was at war with the Goths. Both sides made overtures to the king of the Franks, but he fell upon both and scattered them. Fifteen years afterwards the Franks again descended into Italy, but Narses obtained a complete victory over them at Casilinum by means of his mounted archers. Formed in a dense mass, checked in front, and threatened on both flanks, they were a helpless target for arrows for some hours, but at length broke and were cut to pieces. They fared better at the battle of Poictiers (732 a.d.). They stubbornly resisted, “as if they were frozen to the ground,” all the assaults of the Moorish cavalry, and turned back the tide of Saracen invasion.

But in two or three centuries this sturdy infantry had become a thing of the past. Mounted men-at-arms were the only soldiers of any account in France; and it was nearly a thousand years before French infantry recovered their reputation. General Susane begins his history of it by remarking that infantry always shares the lot of the mass of the population. When men are slumbering, careless or brutalised, under the weight of their chains, it is abject and despised ; and it only shows what it is capable of when privilege and inequality have been displaced by a social system which pays more respect to the dignity of man. Whether or not this is true as an universal proposition, it is certainly true of French infantry. It declined with the growth of the feudal system, and was at its best after the Revolution.

With this we may compare the rules given by Vegetius three centuries afterwards for the drawing up of infantry. It is true that he habitually ” mixes up and confuses the rules and habits of his own and of earlier times” (Lipsius), but in this case he had evidently the warfare of his own day in view. The men were to be formed in six ranks. The two front ranks should be armed and armoured for hand-to-hand fighting, but the men of the second rank should also have bows. Light-armed men with bows, darts, &c., formed the third and fourth ranks, and slingers the fifth ; while the sixth, like the triarii of old, was to consist of the most trusty and best-equipped men, as a reserve. The light-armed troops should run out and engage the enemy, but if they failed to drive him back they should take shelter behind the front ranks, whose duty it was to stand immovable as a Avail.

Such a formation would hardly resist a very serious shock. A happier combination was tried by Narses at Tagina; (5.52 a.d.). He dismounted his heavy cavalry  Lombards, Heruli, &c.  and placed them in the centre of his line, between wings of foot archers wheeled up to cross fire in their front. Repeated charges of the Gothic horsemen were repulsed, and when at length they gave way, the Roman cavalry, which had been held in reserve, completed the victory.^ This was an anticipation of the English tactics of the fourteenth century, but it stands alone. Infantry continued to decline in general estimation, and came to be regarded as only fit for mountain warfare or garrison duty.

Vegetius  complained that the armour which had been cheerfully borne in earlier times was discarded in his day. It was probably found to give only partial protection from missiles, and to be seldom needed for anything else ; but its discontinuance became a reason for avoiding hand-tohand combat.

The provinces were crushed under the burden of such a provision for defence, aggravated as it was by lavish expenditure on public works and public sports. Hope, energy, courage, and enterprise died out, and the people looked to Ceasar for everything. The increase of cavalry was partly to make up for the deterioration of the infantry, partly to meet the swarms of barbarian horsemen, but it did not always serve its purpose. At Adrianople (378 A.D.) the emperor Valens met the fate of Decius, and his army was cut to pieces by the Goths. His successor, Theodosius, adopted the dangerous expedient of enhsting the Gothic horsemen, not as individual recruits, but as bands under their own chiefs, and with their help he subdued the Gallic legions which had rebelled against him.

The Goths themselves were worsted by Belisarius a century and a half afterwards, but he attributed his success to his mounted archers, borrowed from Asiatic warfare. Procopius has described these troops : ” They come to the fight cuirassed and greavcd to the knee. They bear bow and sword, and for the most part a lance also, and a little shield slung on the left shoulder, worked with a strap, not a handle. They are splendid riders, can shoot while galloping at full speed and keep up the arrow flight with equal ease whether they are advancing or retreating. They draw the bow-cord not to the breast, but to the face or even to the right ear, so that the missile flies so strongly as always to inflict a deadly wound, piercing both the shield and cuirass with ease.” ^

The bow was also becoming more and more the weapon of the foot soldier, and foimd its way into the ranks of the legion. A fragment of Arrian, who was governor of Cappadocia in the time of Hadrian, shows how he proposed to draw up his troops to meet a Scythian enemy. His two legions were to be formed eight deep, the four front ranks armed with the pilum, the others with spears. Behind them there was to be a rank of foot archers, and in rear of these the horse archers, who were to shoot over their heads. There were to be bodies of light troops (Armenian archers, &c.) on each wing, with heavy infantry in front of them. The cavalry which was armed with lance and sword was to be in rear, prepared to meet flank attacks. The enemy’s charge was to be met with a general volley of arrows, darts, and stones. If it was nevertheless pushed home, the second and third ranks must close up, and with the first rank must present the points of their pila to the horses, while those behind them threw their weapons.

Auxiliary troops raised in the provinces were attached to the legions and were commanded by their legates. They were cohorts of .500 or 1000 men, some wholly of foot, others including horsemen to the extent of one fourth. Some were armed according to the custom of their country with bows, slings, &c. ; others were equipped and trained in the Roman manner. There were also bodies of horsemen of about the same strength as the cohorts.

In the armies of the Republic there had been a bodyguard for the commander-in-chief which was styled the praatorian cohort. This corps was raised to nine cohorts by Augustus, and did guard duty in Rome, and at the imperial residences elsewhere. It comprised horse and foot, grew by degrees to 50,000 men, and played a prominent part in the making and unmaking of emperors till it was abolished by Constantine.

Under the system adopted by Augustus and his successors, the empire ” presented to its foes a hard shell and a soft kernel.” There were no reserves of troops in the interior, and when legions were drawn from the frontier to support rival claimants to the imperial title, the outer barbarians broke through the shell. The Goths crossed the Danube, stormed Philippopolis, and destroyed the emperor Decius and his army (a.d. 251). A few years afterwards another emperor, Valerian, had to surrender to the Persians, who overran Syria and stormed Antioch.

When order was restored by Diocletian at the end of the century, new corps were formed to serve as an imperial field force. The legions of these Palatini and Coviitatenses numbered only 1000 men, and comprised both horse and foot. They had auxiliary cohorts attached to them, and themselves contained a large barbarian element which increased as time went on. They were moved from one region to another as occasion arose. The older legions, left as garrison troops on the frontiers, gradually became bodies of military colonists rather than soldiers. Service in them was unpopular, for the work was hard, discipline severe, and rewards tardy.i The cavalry was again withdrawn from them and separately organised. From one-tenth it rose to about one-third of the infantry. The strength of the frontier army is reckoned at 060,000 by Mommsen, and the field force, or emperor’s army, at something under 200,000, making a total of more than half a million of men, of whom nearly 160,000 were mounted.

Sometimes Ceasar had to check the ardour of his men, sometimes to reprove their rashness, greed for booty, and disregard of orders.” Occasionally, they gave way to panic which even he was unable to overcome, or broke out into mutiny {e.g. the legions in Campania, when ordered to Africa). But on the whole, as Mommsen says, “perhaps there never was an army which was more perfectly what an army ought to be.”

Its quality was shown at Pharsalia (48 B.C.), where it encountered an army of more than twice its numbers, trained in the same fashion, and commanded by a general whom some people are disposed to rank even higher than Caesar. Pompey had 7000 horsemen, Caesar only 1000 ; but the latter intermixed infantry with his cavalry, and formed a corps of six cohorts to support them. These cohorts, using their pila as spears, charged Pompey’s cavalry as it was preparing to fall upon the flank of the legions, and drove it off the field. Then they wheeled round the enemy’s left, and assisted Ca3sar’s front attack by an attack in rear.

Pompey, distrusting his infantry, kept them halted, that they might be fresh and in good order when Caesar’s men arrived fatigued and out of breath. But, as Caesar says, ” there is a certain alacrity and ardour of mind planted by nature in every man which is inflamed by the desire of fighting, and which commanders ought not to repress, but to excite. Nor was it idly laid down of old that the trumpets should sound, and the whole army raise a shout, whereby, as they reckoned, the enemy would be struck with terror and our own men en- couraged.” ^ He had the advantage of this stimulus without disordering his troops, for they were well enough in hand to halt and recover breath before closing. The Pompeian legions, assailed on both sides, held their ground for a time, but at length fled to their camp. The battle had lasted till noon and the weather was extremely hot, yet Caesar persuaded his troops to storm the camp, and to pursue the enemy for several miles, twice intrenching themselves in the course of their advance.

The reduction of the legionaries to a single type, a ” handy man “fit for any job, even to attack cavalry, was not without its drawbacks. The auxiliaries on whom dependence was placed for cavalry and light troops often failed, and the legionary had to deal with a more mobile enemy whom he could not bring to close combat. In his second invasion of Britain Ctesar found this the case, and shortly afterwards the troops under Sabinus and Gotta were destroyed on the march by the desultory tactics of Ambiorix,^ as the legions of Varus were afterwards destroyed by Arminius. In the African war (4G B.C.) Caesar found himself enveloped in an open plain near Ruspina by a great force of cavalry and light troops, chiefly Numidian. He had oO cohorts, but only 400 horsemen and 1.50 archers. The enemy closed in and threw darts into the cohorts. When the latter charged, the horsemen retired, and waited for their opportunity when the ranks should be broken in pursuit or in combat with the light troops. C;esar had to check the sallies of his men, and they were gradually pressed together into a circle ; a good target for missiles. Caesar saw that he must break the enemy’s ring surrounding him ; so he drew his troops out in as long a line as he could, made alternate cohorts face about, burst the ring with his flank cohorts, and then charged the two halves of it. He was then able to make good his retreat to his camp.

In the following year (217 B.C.) Hannibal surprised a Roman army in the defile of Trasimene. It found itself blocked in front and rear, as in the Caudine valley a century before. Here again 6000 men succeeded in breaking through the troops enveloping them, though they were overtaken and forced to surrender next day. The Libyan infantry was rearmed in the Roman manner from the spoils of this battle.

The moral effect of these victories and confidence in his own skill made Hannibal gladly accept battle against odds of nearly two to one. At Cannae (216 B.C.) he had 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. The two consuls opposed to him had eight Roman legions with their quota of allies, numbering 80,000 foot and 6000 horse ; but the heavy losses of the two previous years must have told severely on their quality. Each consul commanded in chief on alternate days, milius Paullus, a tried soldier, was resolved to avoid battle in the open plain on account of the enemy’s superiority in horse ; but Terentius Varro, who was rash and inexperienced, thought otherwise, and played into Hannibal’s hands. He left 10,000 men in a camp on the left bank of the Aufidus, took the rest of the army across, and drew it up facing south with its right resting on the river. Hannibal followed suit, and drew up his army opposite, with Cannto to his loft roar.i The Numidian cavalry was on the Carthaginian right, the Spanish and Gallic cavalry on the left. Of the infantry, the Gauls and Spaniards were intermixed in the centre, and the Libyans were to right and left of them. He pushed forward his centre and made his line of battle convex, in order that the Gauls and Spaniards might be first engaged, and the African troops be held in reserve. The Gauls were armed with a broad sword, and used the edge only, not the point. Open order was necessary for them to wield their weapon, and their line was long and thin. The Roman order on the contrary was very deep. The maniples were closer together than usual, and the depth of each maniple was several times greater than its front.” This was probably due to want of space for their large numbers. It seems to imply that their frontage was not more than one-fourth of what was customary, so that the whole of their infantry would not occupy more than two miles.

While the cavalry were engaged with one another on the wings, there was a skirmish of light-armed troops in the centre. When these fell back, the Roman line began to press upon the convex front of the Gauls and Spaniards. It yielded and gradually became concave ; the maniples of the Roman centre pushed onward, and those of the wings drew towards the centre, where the stress of the battle lay. It seemed as though the Carthaginian army would be cut in two, as at the Trebia. But the Libyans on the wings were now faced left and right, and wound inwards and rearwards as the Gauls and Spaniards fell back, until as pincers they had fairly enclosed the Roman wedge, when they fell with fury upon its flanks.

By this time the Carthaginian cavalry on the left wing had routed the Roman cavalry opposed to it, had joined the Numidians on the right, and defeated the allied cavalry. Leaving the Numidians to pursue, it had then fallen upon the rear of the legions. Surrounded on all sides, the Romans seem to have lost hope. They made no vigorous effort to break through, but were pressed together and gradually cut down. Five-sixths of their whole army perished, while the Carthaginian loss was under 6000. Polybius regards the battle as “a lesson to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both,” but he recognises elsewhere that it was to the skill and genius of Hannibal that the Romans owed their defeats.

Alexander had to do with an enemy vastly superior in numbers, but inferior in quality and in manoeuvring powers. This determined him to deliver his attack on one wing, that he might not be enveloped. Alike at the Granicus, at Issus, and at Arbela, he struck with his right. At Issus the supporting brigades of the phalanx had a severe struggle with the Greek mercenaries in Persian pay until the Hypaspists and cavalry, having routed the Persian left, took the mercenaries in flank. At Arbela the defensive wing was so hardly pressed by Indian and Persian cavalry that Parmenio had to send to Alexander for help. In the battle on the Hydaspes against Porus the left of the enemy was again selected for attack; Hypaspists and light troops seem to have been the only infantry engaged. When Alexander reorganised his army after his return from India, he proposed to use Orientals for the phalanx to the extent of three-fourths. Only the three leading men and the last man of each file were to be Macedonians; the rest were armed with bows and javelins.

In the wars of Alexander’s successors armies were more alike in numbers and quality, and mobility lost some of its importance. But the increasing use of elephants went along with a deterioration of infantry. Posted at intervals of 50 yards or so along the whole front of each army with shot between them, they made any general advance and engagement of the foot difficult. Practically the fighting was done by the cavalry on the wings, and the infantry of the line only served to fill the space between them. What had hitherto been the best elements of the infantry were attracted to the cavalry, and their places were taken by mercenaries or subject races.

In Europe this was not the case to the same extent as in Asia. Value continued to be attached in Greece to heavy infantry, but it was concentrated upon the phalanx. ” What had formed in the time of Philip and Alexander merely a solid base for the free activity of the other kinds of foot, now came to be regarded as the instrument for deciding the issue, and obtaining the victory.” i Men tried in vain to make it flexible and mobile without forfeiting its own special characteristic, impenetrability. The impossibility of this was shown at Cynos-cephaLe (197 B.C.) and Pydna (168 B.C.) when the Macedonian phalanx was worsted by the Roman legions ; but these actions may be better dealt with as incidents of Roman history.